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In the Supreine Court
of the S·tate of Utah

NELLIE DOWSETT,
Plaintiff and Appella,nt,

Case No.

vs.

7263

DAR"\YIX DO\YSETT,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS

While \Ve substantially agree with appellant's statement of the evidence relating to the operation of the car
by Harold H. Dowsett and Nellie Dowsett, his wife,
father and mother of the defendant, Darwin Dowsett, we
are not in accord with appellant's conclusions with re~prct thereto.
\Vhile · in the Army at Camp Maxey, Tex-as, the defendant, Darwin Dowsett, arranged for living quarters
for himself and his wife at a little town caUed Paris
near the military camp (Tr. 45-6). His wife, Evangeline,
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arranged for her sister and. rnother to care for the two
small children while she was gone. She, Evangeline, did
not drive a car, but the family car, a 1940 Dodge fourdoor sedan, record title of which was in her husband,
Darwin Dowsett, was in her custody. vVhen it was used
by her, she would get someone else to drive. Defendant's
mother, Nellie Dowsett, had driven this car on occ-asions
ever since defendant purchased it in 1942 (Tr. 5::3). She
was an experienced driver, and as to the use of her own
family car, she drove as frequently as her husband (Tr.
55).
Darwin testified he te'lephoned his wife abont two
weeks before she left Salt Lake or Holladay, Utah, and
asked: ''If she couldn't get l\1other and Dad to drive the
car down." (Tr. 47). Thereafter, Evangeline phoned
plaintiff, her mother-in-law, ''and asked her if she and
her husband could drive the car down," and "asked her
if she would like to go," ( Tr. 83) and "if she and her
husband (Harold) could drive the car. Each was to
relieve the other in the driving going down there" (Tr.
84). About a week after the first phone call, Evangeline
told her husband ''that she had made arrangements for
them to bring it (the car) down'' (Tr. 56). N'othing
was said about anyone else driving other •than 1\f r. and
Mrs. Dowsett, and that was the extent of the arrangements made (Tr. 85).
The Dows,eitts left as planned at four o'clock A.l\1.
July 30, 1945. They were proceeding east in Daniels
Canyon ori U. S. Highway 40 about thirty-five miles eaRt
of Heber, Utah. Harold Dowsett was driving; the plain2
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tiff, Xellie Dow~ett, hi~ wife, wn~ ~itting nPxt to him in
the front ::'eat; and in the rPar were Evangeline and another lady. a ~l r~. Thomas, who wa~ riding with them
(Tr. 7~). ...\::-' the car reached the summit, the sunlight
struck :,Jr. Dowsett in the face. He said: ".Just as we
came to the top, why, just as levelled out, why the sun
was right in my eyes·' so '·I couldn't see.'' He ''held
the whee'l right steady and straight. I thought it was,
switch off or change-something: it· didn't.'' He estimated he may have traveled t"·o hunflred feet, something
like that, hut further added: • 'I wouldn't know for sure,
approximately, I don't know how far it was. I felt the
car in the loose gravel, I put the brakes on" (Tr. 65-66).
He did not remember anything further, as he was rendered unconscious ( Tr. 67).

It is undisputed that the

car overturned, which resulted in plaintiff's injuries.
There was nothing out of the ordinary or unexpected
so far the highway and the operations of the car were
concerned, other than the fact that the sun suddenly
blinded the driver.
Nellie Dowsett testified that she was turned talking
to those in the hack seat and was not watching the road,
but that she did not remember anything that was unusual
at the time: that her husband wa;.; driving in an ordinary
and usual manner ( Tr. 125) ; that he was paying attention to his driving, was on his proper side of the highwa~·.

trave'ling at a speed of about thirty to thirty-five

milP;.; per hour.

He seemed to have perfect rontrol of
•)

.)
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the car, and she had no criticism at all of the manner
in which he was driving and made no objection thereto
(Tr. 126).
Evangeline testified that she had not noticed an~'
thing unusual about the driving on the highwa~· (Tr. 82):
that she did not expect an accident, and ~r r. Dowsett
was driving along in the usual and ordinary manner at
a reasonable rate of speed on his proper side of the
highway; that he was watching where he was going and
seemed to have perfect control of the car (Tr. 83).
That was the sum and substance of the evidence,
all elicited from plaintiff's witnesses, the only onrf' called
being the four mentioned, namely: p1aintiff and her husband, and the defendant, Darwin Dowsett, and his wife,
Evangeline.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, both parties
rested, and defendant moved for a directed verdict upon
several grounds (Tr. 13'5-136), as follows:
"(1) The evidence affirmatively shows that
the plaintiff and the driver of the automobile in
which she was riding were fellow servants as a
matter of law and that she cannot recover because of the fact that she was such a fellow
servant.
'' (2) That plaintiff is not for any reason a
feHow servant, that she is then a guest in the
automobile as a matter of law, and therefore cannot recover.
"(3) That the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to constitute an action against the def,endant.
" ( 4) That plaintiff has failed to prove any
negligent act on the part of the driver of the

4
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automobile in which plaintiff wa~ riding.
•· ( ;) ) That plaintiff has failed to prove that
if there wai' any negligence on tlw part of the
(lriY~r of th~ antmnobile in whieh plaintiff was
riding, that ~uch net of nP§..?;ligenee, if an~·, \Va~
the proximate cause of the accident and resulting
injuries.
" ( 6) That the evidence affirmatively shows
that the plaintiff failed to 1nake any obj·ection to
the manner in which the antomobi'le was driven
and acquiesced in the manner in which it was
driven, and voluntarily asslnned the risk.
" ( 7) That the evidence affirn1atively shows
that if there was an~· negligence on the part of
the driver of ~aid auton1obile, the plaintiff was
herself gnilty of contributory negligence, which
proximate!~· contributerl to the cause of the accident.
·' (8) That it affirmatively appears from the
evidence that the aecident was solely caused by
reason of an unforeseen circumstance; namely, the
blinding of the sun: and the accident was unavoidable so far a~ the driver wa~ concerned.
'' (9) That the evidenee of the plaintiff is
insufficient to go to the jury on any theory.'' (Tr.
V~f>-6).

QUESTIONS ON APPEAL

The only question argued by appellant, and she
insists that it is the only question before this court, is
that the court erred in granting defendant's motion on
the hasi:;; of the fellow ~ervant rule.
Respondent contends that the lower court properly
(lirectNl a verdict in favor of defendant based upon the
fellow :-:eiTant ru'le, and also contends that there were
other reasons wh~· defenrlant's motion was properl~T
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granted. In other words, we are firmly convinced that
all of the reasons exist for the application of the fellow
servant rule in this case, but there wenc' also other
grounds or reasons why the holding of the lower court
was correct. It is a well-established rule in this and
other jurisdictions that if the ruling of the 'lower court
should be sustained on any grounds, the judgment should
be affirmed.
Trude,au v. Pacific States Box. & flasket ('o.,
(Wash.) 148 Pac. (2d) 453;
Shaw v. O'B'yrne, 64 Utah 139, 2~8 Par. 570:
Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 Pac. 977:
Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Build·ing & Loan .AssJu.,
75 Pac. (2d) 669, 94 Utah 97.
Specific Q'.l·estions

Specifically the legal questions can be summarized
in the following propositions contended for by respondent:
I. If Darwin Dowsett had the .right to control the
operations of the car to be driven by his father, Harold
Dowsett, and his mother, Nellie Dowsett, then the latter
were working in the same grade of service together and
for a common purpose within the definition of a fellow
servant under the Utah Statute, Section 49-6-2, Utah
Code A'YI/YI)otated 1943.
II. If Darwin Dowsett did not have the right to
control the operations of the car as to how the car was
to he driven, what route was to be taken, etc. (as contended by appel~ant. See App. Br. page 11), then Harold
and Nellie Dowsett were not servants or agents of the
defendant, Darwin Dowsett, and plaintiff cannot recover
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from defendant, Darwin Dowsett, because the negligence,
if any there exi~ted, could not then be hnputed to him.
III. If the foregoing reasons should not be existent, that is, if Nellie and Harold Dowsett were not
agent~ or servants of the defendant, Darwin Dowsett,
then Jl r~. Dowsett '"a~ a guest in the automobile and
a~ no willful misconduct or intoxication was claimed or
proved, there could he no liability.
IV. Plaintiff voluntarily undertook the trip and
acquiesced in the manner in which the car was driven
and assumeel the ri:;;ks or hazards incident to the trip.

ARGUMENT
I. Application of Fe!low Servant Rule.
Plaintiff insisted that she and her husband were
acting for and on behalf of the defendant, Darwin Dow~ett, their son, in the operation of the automobile, and
upon that premise claim that the negligence, if any, of
Harold Dowsett, was imputed to defendant, and therefore that defendant is liable to the plaintiff, Nellie Dow~ett, his mother, for her husband's alleged negligence.
The suit is one prosecuted by a mother against her son
for her husband's negligence.
If Harold Dowsett was the agent or servant of
Darwin Dowsett, his son, for the purpose of driving
the rar or delivering it to its ultimate destination at

Camp Maxey, then the p'laintiff, Nellie Dowsett, was
likewiPe an agent and servant for exactly the same purpose. They were both requested and engaged to do the
:-;amr

thing. They had a common master. Their duties,

if any, were eo-equal and to a common purpose, namely: ·

7
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to drive and deliver the c:1r to Camp ~faxey, Texa~.
Neither was placed in charge of the other or entrusted
with any superintendene~- or control over the other. Each
was expected to relieve the other in driving during the
trip.
A. Reason and Basis for FeH:>w Servant Rule.

The fellow-servant rule is recognized in the common
law and is in effect that the negligence of one fellowservant will not be imputed to the principal or master
in an action brought by a co-worker or a fe'llow-servant.
The reason for the rule is based upon public policy and
upon the doctrine of assumption of risk. It is an exception to the general rule of agency. The common law rule was early recognized hy the
Utah courts, and the basis for the rule is summed up in
Dryburg v. Milnilng & Millilng Co., 18 Utah 410, ;)f> Pac.
367, as follows:
''Before the enactment defining who shall be
regarded as fellow servants, the Supreme Court
of the late territory of Utah repeatedly held that
the definition did not include all the agents and
servants of the common master, but onl~· those
employed in the same line of duty, and of the same
grade and habitually associating and working together under such circumstances that the care,
caution, and watchfulness of each may have an
influence upon the others, promotive of diligence,
care, and caution with respect to their common
safety, and under such circumstances that each
may have an opportunity of observing the conduct of the others, and of making proper suggestions to him and to the common employer or hiR
superintendent or proper agent, or of avoiding
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;nl"

· injnry from ~nch negJligenee. This smne rule Hw~·
also be deduced frmn the decisions of the rourt:-; ol'
other states. Daniels v. Railway Co., 6 Utah 357,
23 Pac. 7G2: \Yebb v. Railroad Co., 7 Utah '363,
2G Pac. ~lSl; Armstrong v. Railway Co., 8 Utah
-±:20, -12 Pae. 693: Railway Co. v. :.'.! oranda, 108
Ill. 5/G: :Jiill Co. v ..Johnson, 114 Ill. 57, 29 N. E .
. 186; Railroad Co. v. Kelly, 127 Ill. 637, 21 N. ~.

203.''
Prior to the enactn1ent of our Utah Statute, the
co~ut poin~s out in.Armstroug z·. 0. S. L ..and Ut·ah Northern Ry. Co., 8 Utah .-120, 32 Pac. 693, that the rule had
no application where the negligent aet. was the act of
one in authority over the plaintiff. Said t~e court:
"While it mav be reasonaWe to infer that
men laboring together with equal 'a:u:thorit.y will,
by their watchfulness, their suggestions, prudenee,
and their example, influence eaeh other, it would
be unreasonable to presume that they will so influence the men in authority over them, and to
whose orders they are subjeet.''
Title 49, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1943, origina'lly adopted Revised Statutes of Utah 1898, dealing
with fel:ow-fervants, now provides:
· · -~:9-6-l. Yice Principal Defined.
~\ll pPrsons engaged in the serviee of any
person and intrusted by such employer with authorit~- of superintendenee, control or command
of other persons in the employ or service of such
· employer, or 'vith authority to direct any other
emp·;o~·cp in tlw performance of any duties of
such employee, are vice principals of such em·ployer. and are not fellow servants.
'' -l-~)-(i-2. Fellow Servants Defined.
All persons who are engaged in the service of
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any employer, and who while so engaged are in
the same grade of service and are working together at the same> time and place and to a common purpose, neither of such persons being intrusted by such employer with an~· superintendence or control over his fellow employees, arP
fel~ow Fervants with eaeh other; }Jrovir!Pd, that
nothing herein eontained shall be so ennstrued a~
to make the employees of such emplo~~er fellow
servants with other employees engagc>d in any
other department or service of sueh employer.
Employees who do not eome within the provisions
of this seetion shall not be ronsiflr:·prl fellow
servants. ''
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Schoer, (Ct. App. 8th
Cir.) 114 Fed. 466, the court did not exempt the railroad
company from liability in an action brought by a fireman
injured by reason of the negligence of an engineer, who
was entrusted with superior authority in the operation
of the train, for the reason that the engineer was a vice
principal within the definition of the statute. With respect to the statute, the court said:
''The purpose and effect of the sections of the
statute of Utah which have been cited were not
to change or to extend the liability of masters
for the negligence of their servants, but their sole
object and effect were to give an authoritative
legislative definition of the terms 'vice principal' and 'fellow servant,' and to leave the liabilities of the masters for the acts of their
servants as they were before these sections 'verP
enacted.''
The court made the observation that had the workmen
been engaged in the same grade of service in the opera-

10
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tion of the railrocHl. then the negligence would not have
been imputed to the principal.
In Lukic r. Southern Par. Co., ( Cir. Ct. Dist. Utah)
lGO Fed. 135, the ronrt sustained a directed verdict for
the defendant in an action brought by the plaintiff, a
laborer in the construction of the road bed, based upon
the alleged negligence of a brakeman of a construction
train hauling gravel for the same road bed. A portion
of the opinion foUows :
''The true Yiew of the fellow servant excep-.
tion to the general rule of the master's liability
i:-: based on the doctrine of assumption of risk.
The se1Tant realizes \Yhen he accepts the service
that he is liable to inju r~7 h~· the negligence of
other servants of the fame master, \Yhose service
i:-: ~o related to his own that negligence on their
part in the natura~ and expected course of events
r1ay injure him, nohYithstanding a complete performance h~· the master of his nonassignable
duties. This anticipated risk the servant assumes,
and his assumption is as broad as his reasonable
antiripation of flang-er. 'Vhen the services of two
:-o:()rrants are fo w-idely separated, so wanting in
eon'act, that some unusual event must occur to
flirect the resnlts of the negligence of the one to
the other, the two are said to belong to separate
departments. In the ease of Northern Pacific R.
Co. v. I-Iambly, 1f>4 1!. S. 349, 357, 14 Sup. Ct. 983,
!lR4, 38 L. Ed. 1009, it was said:
'' '.\s the laborer upon a railroad track,
either in switching trains or repairing the
track, is constantl~· exposed to the danger of
rassing trains, and :bound to look out for
them, any negligence in the management of
~nch trains is a risk which may or should be
11
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l
contemplated by him in entering upon the
service of the company .. This is probabl~· th('
most satisfactor~· test of liabi'lity. If the d~
partments of the two ~ ervants flre so far
separated from each other that the possibility of coming in contact, and hence of incurring danger from the negligent performanc· •
of the duties of such other department, coulrl
not be said to be within the contemplation of
the person injured, the doctrine of fellow
service should not apply. In this Yiew it is
not difficult to reconcile the numerous cases
which hold that persons whose duty it is to
keep railroad cars in good order and repair
are not engaged in a common employment
with those who run or operate them.'
''And so in the case of Randall v. Baltimor~
& Ohio R. Co., 109 U. R. 478, 3 Sup. Ct. 322,
27 L. Ed. 1003, it was held that a brakeman working a switch for his train on one track in a rai1road yard was a fellow servant of an enr.-ineer
of another train on an adjacent track. It was
pointed out ~that they were employed and paid h~·
the same master and that the duties of the two
brought them to work at the same time and placr
for the common purpose of moving traim~, so that
the negligence of one in doing. his work might
injure the other. In Northern Pacific R. Co. Y.
Charless, 162 U.S. 359, 16 Sup. Ct. 848, 40 L. Ed.
999, a day laborer on a section was held to he
a fellow servant .with the crew of a freight train:
and in Martin v. Atchison, To:peka & Santa Fe,
166 U. S. 399, 17 Sup. Ct. 603, 41 L. Ed. 1051,
a similar laborer with the crew of a work tr.ain.
"Now, what change has the statute made?
It has, it is true, ingrafted the discredited superior
servant limitation; hut that is not pertinent her<'.

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Beyond thi:-;, it providP~ that to bt> fellow servants
the two servants mn~t be working together at the
same time and place and to a eommon purpose.
\Yhat is mean h~· 'together'? The Illinois doctrine of ron~ocia tion doe~ not require that the
s •JTant~ should be doing the same kind of work,
or he engaged in aiding each other in the same
detail of labor. By 'together' is meant physical
nearne~s at the time of the injury, coupled with
the common purpose of the 1abors of the two
~eJTant~: the nearne:-;~ required being only that
,,·hich :-;hould arouse in the one a reasonable
appreciation of probable danger from the neglect
nf the other. 1 do not belieYp that the statute
should be otherwi~P construed.''
B. Other Utah Cases.
While in most of the cm:~es decided hy this court
under the statute, it was held the facts were not sufficient
to establish the feNow servant relation, in each of the
cases so holding, the plaintiff was either working under
a superior, or not working in the same place or grade of
service. However, once the relationship exists as defined
h~· the statute, there is no reason why the master or
principal is not exempted from liability.
In Dryburg r. Jf ercur Gold Mining & Milling Co.,
18 Utah 410, ;)5 Pac. 367, supra, the court held that there
was a jury question as to whether plaintiff and a fenow
miner were fellow servants where the p1aintiff was working in a mine about forty feet from the top of a ladder
and was injured when going down the ladder for a sledge,
and the claimed negligence was the negligence of another
miner who worked in a tunnel twelve feet below in
removing at an earlier time that morning, waste whieh
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.,1
had been supporting one of the uprights of the ladder.
In Jenkins v. llfammoth Mining Company, 24 Utah
513, 68 Pac. 845, it was held that a miner was not a fellow
servant with one whose duty it was to manage and operate a cage by which miners were conveyed in and out
of the mine. Says the court:
"The plaintiff and Knotts were employee8
of the defendant, and neither was intrusted bv
their emp~oyer with superintendence or rontr~l
over the other; but in view of the evidence, and
the provisions of said section, were theY engage<i
in the same service, and working together at the
same time and place, to a common pnrp'I~P 1
Knotts was employed in running the elevator,
while the occupation of the plaintiff was that of
a miner on the 1,800 foot level of the mine. They
were not, therefore, engaged in the same grade
of service. Knotts' employment was not that of a
miner, and he was not engaged. in working with
the plaintiff on the 1,800 foot level; nor was thr
plaintiff engaged at work when injured, but waB
merely being conducted to his place of emploYment. They were not, therefore, engaged in working together at the same time and place."
In Meyers v. San Pedro Railroad Company, ~61Ttah
307, 104 Pac. 736, it appeared that two sections of a train
were operated as two distinct and independent trains.
It was held that the members of the crew of one section
were not fellow servants of the members of the crew of
the other section. Says the court:
"It is made to appear that the two sectionB
of the train were run and operated as two distinrt
and independent trains, and that the defendant
regarded and treated them as being subject to
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the rule~ applirable to the running and operation
of separate trains. The que~tion then arise~: .Are
the member~ of train crews of separate trains
fellow servants within the meaning of the statute?
\Ye think they are not. They are not in such case
·working tog·ether at the same time and place
and to a rommon purpose.' ''
In Shepherd t. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company, 41 Utah 469, 126 Pac. 692, the question before the
court was whether the jury had been correct'ly instructed.
In discussing the fellow servant rule, the court declares:
•'Before this exemption from liability can
exist, however, our law requires that the hvo
~ervants must be engaged in the same grade of
service and working together at the same time
and place and to a common purpose, and neither
intrusted with any superintendence. or control
over the other. The term 'same grade of service'
does not mean whether theY earn the same amount
of money, or whether they are doing exactly
simi~ar work; but it means whether they are on
the same level, so far as the exercise of an authorit~~ over each other is concerned. The term
'working together ·at the same time and place'
does not mean whether they were working at the
exact spot and doing exactly the same kind of
work; but it means whether, in the discharge of
their dutie~, they may fairly be said to be thrown
in such contact with each other so that they have
a fair opportunity of observing the habits and
demeanor of each other, and thus are in a position to form a conclusion as to the carefulness
or noncarefulness of the habits and conduct. of
the other. The term 'working to a common purpose' means whether their work may fairly be
said to he within some division or department
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of the defendant's business, and directed to some
end within such division or department.''
In Vota v. Ohio Co~pper Comparny, 42 Utah 129, 129
Pac. 349, the plaintiff, a mucker in a mine, was called by
an engineer to assist in unloading timbers by means of a
hoist and had his arm crushed between a tirn'ber and the
hoist drum. Held the plaintiff and the engineer were not
fellow servants. The decision was predicated upon a consideration of what was the usual employment of the two
servants rather than what they were doing at the time
of the accident. Says the court:
"Under the undisputed facts in this case,
appellant's regular and usual emplo~·ment was
that of a mucker in respondent's mine. He was
temporarily transferred from the mine to assist
in unloading timbers from railroad cars. The
engineer in charge of the engine which was used
to hoist the timbers was engaged in operating the
engine. The two were, therefore, not, before they
came together in unloading the timbers, engaged
in the same grade of service within the meaning
of our statute, although they were at the time
of the accident working together at the same time
and place and to a common purpose.''
In Shields v. Silver King Coali.tion Mines Co., 50
Utah 138, 166 Pac. 988, plaintiff was working on the 1,000
foot level, from which an incline extended upward to the
900 foot level, on which incHne loaded cars were let down
and empties drawn up, and plaintiff was injured by the
negligence of a miner on the 900 foot level in letting one
of the cars down. Held they were not fellow servants
as they were not working together at the same time and
r
place.
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In Arrascada r. ,t...,'ilr1T Kill!/ C'ualition Jfines Co.,:-)-~
Utah 386, 181 Pae. 159, plaintiff, a miner, who had been
engaged in the con~trnction of a ehnte was directed to
proceed to a higher leYel in the Inine to work, which might
be more dangerous than what he wa~ doing. He inquired
of miners above, who were drilling and blasting, if it wa~
safe, and receiving an affirmative an::-;wer, he proceeded
upward and ·was struck hy a falling rock. Plaintiff was
not present when the drillers were working and had
nothing whatever to do with their work. Held drillers
were not fellow servants of the plaintiff. Says the court:
"In an elaborate argument it is contended
that, even if Breen and Allen were negligent,
the defendant is not liable, because they were
fellm,· servants of the deceased. According to the
evidence of plaintiffs, the deceased was not a
fellow servant 'of Breen and Allen, or either of
them. The working plarp of the deceased \Vas
in the chute below the bulkhead. The working
place of Breen and Allen was in the raise above
the bulkhead. The deceased was doing timbering
or carpenter work. Breen and AUen were doing
the work of miners. In Dryburg v. l\1ercur Gold
:.r. & ~f. Co., 18 Ftah 410, ;);) Pac. 367, it is said:
" 'Two servants of a common master may be
at work within five feet of each other, or a less
distance, and still not be fellow servants. A wall
may be between them, and the one may have no
opportunity of knowing how the other performs
his work.' ''
C. Fellow Servant Cases in the Ope·ration of Automobiles.
That the fellow servant rule is applied by the courts
where the fellow se.rvamts are engaged in the operation
of an automobile is iUustrated in the following cases.
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In Carter v. Uhrich, (Kan.) 264 Pac. 31, plaintiff
was riding with a co-employee back to the factory after
unloading a load at the railroad station. The judgment
in favor of plaintiff was reversed on appeal and judgment entered for defendant. Said the court:
"We have no hesitancy in concluding that
the injured workman in this case was a fellow
servant of the driver of the truck and the doctrine of the assumption of risk caused by the
negligence of a fellow servant should apply here
and will prevent a recovery for the injury sustained.''
In B~ack Diamond Lumber Co. v. Smlith, (Ark.) 76
S.W. ('2d) 975, two employees were both truck drivers.
Together they had delivered some lumber, picked up
some furniture and were returning to their employer'R
mill when the truck left the road. We quote:
"Were Ward and Ogden fellow servantsT
If they were then there can be no recovery. We
have held that 'a truck driver transporting other
employees of his master for the purpose of assisting him in unloading a car of cement was a
fellow servant for whose negligence causing injury to one of such employees, the master wa~
not liable.' "
The same result was reached in Charles Weaver a·

Co. v. Harding, (Miss.) 180 So. 825, where plaintiff was
riding to work in his employer's truck with other fellow
employees.
See also Buckley v. United Gas Public Service Co.,
(Miss.) 168 So.' 462, where plaintiff, an employee of a
gas company crew laying a pipe line was injured while
18
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being transported from work in a trnek drivPn h~· a
co-employee.
Za.rski c. Creamer, (:~la~s.) ;)9 ~.E. (2d) 70-!;
Blanchard r. Oallalia r, (Ga.) 33 ~.11 ~. ( 2d) 378,
(where the rna ttPr wa~ disposed of on demurrer) :
]{rndrick c. Ideal Hnldin9 Co., (Fla..) 188 So.
778.
D. There is No -Legal Distinction Between Principal and
Agent and Mast,er ~nd Servant.
Plaintiff argues there is a legal distinction betwN•n
principal and agent and master and servant; however,
these terms are used interehangeably in the law of torts.
The right to cont'f'lol is the essential elen1ent whieh must
be present and whieh is the legal basis for imputing the
negligence of a servant or agent to his master or principal. That no consideration of compensation is paid
by the principa1 or master for the service rendered does
not change the relationship.
In McNeal v. illcKailn, (Okla.) 126 Pac. 742, it was
held that a son was a servant of his father where he,
the son, took a sister and a guest of the family riding
in the father's automobile. No consideration was paid.
Said the court :
'' Y ehicles and nwtor cars may be used, not
only for the business of the master for profit, hut
also in his business for pleasure. If Paul, the
minor son of the plaintiff in error, had been driving his father's carriage (whilst he was a member of his family) in which were contained his
sister and a guest of his father's house, the same
being done by him with the express or implied
consent of his father, the relation of master and
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servant would exist, and the father would he
liable for the negligent acts of the ._son whilst
engaged in the driving of the carriage, and the
same rule is supported by authority as to motor
cars.''
In Jom.ik v. Ford Motor Co., (Mich.) 147 N."\V. 510,
Werner purchased a car at the Ford Motor plant, which
loaned one of its employees to assist the purchaser in
driving the car to the outskirts of the city. The court
held in so driving the car the Ford Motor car employee
was the servant of. Werner and not the Motor Company,
although there was ''no actual contract of employment
be'tween them or payment for ser'/Jiice. '' Said the court:
''tf an employer loans a servant to another
for sonie special service, the latter with respect
to that ·t,ervice may be liable as a master for the
acts of the servant without any actual contract
of employment between them or payment for
service. (Citing authorities)."
In Andre1as v. Cox, (Mo.) 23 S.W. (2d) 1066, a
garagem~n in returning an automobile to the owner a~
an act of accommodation, no consideration being paid,
was he~d to be a servant. Said the court:
''One who drives a car as a mere accommodation or favor to the owner of the car i~ the
servant of the owner.''
The master servant relationship was similarly held
to exist in Baker v. M ase·ath, (Ariz.) 179 Pac. 53, although there was no consideration paid the agent or
servant. The terms master and servant and principal
and agent were used interchangeably by the court.
Similarly this court makes no distinction in JlcFarlane v. Winters, 47 Utah 598, 155 Pac. 437. H. is pointrcl
1
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out that •·the right to eontrol" ~~ tlw mw <'~~<'ll t ial n•quirement to e~tablish the relation~hip of prineipal an<l
agent or ma~ter and servant in the opern·tion of an automobile. The eourt further held that that relationship wa~
not e~talJlished n~ between a father and son who wen•
named eo-defendants upon proof that the father owned
the ear and had pennitted hi~ son to drive a guest of the
family to a nearby tmn1.
In Fo.r v. Larender, 89 Utah 11:-l, 56 Pac. (2d) 1049,
this court said at the bottom of page 118 of the Utah
report:
•' The test of whether one is the agent of the
other depends upon ·the ri.ght of the control of
one over the other. The san1e principles of agency
apply to the running of an automobile as apply
to any other field of action.''
Inasmuch as the right to control is required to establish the relationship of principal and agent or master
and servant, and as payment of compensation is not
essential to the establishment of either relationship, there
i~ no distinction between the two terms. What name is
used or attached to the relationship cannot 1egally operate to change the actual character of such relationship.
We may call :3f r. and _Mrs. Dowsett servants of the defendant, Darwin Dowse~tt, whereas appellants may call
them agents, but that does not make any actual legal
distinction in the true character of 1:.he relationship.
The true test is that the circumstances and conditions enumerated in the statute exist, that is, that the
persons involved are engaged in the same grade of service and working together at the same time and place
:21
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and to a common purpose, and under such circumstances
that 1the care, caution and watchfulness of each would
normal~y have an influence upon the other promotive of
diligence, care and caution with respect to their common safety, and such that each would have an opportunity of observing the conduct of the other and of making proper suggestions 'to him or her or avoiding injury
from such negligence. That is the basis of the rule
defined by the statute and as aptly stated in the Dryburg
v. Minitng ~and Millilng Compa;ny case, supra.
It would be difficult to find a situation where those
conditions are clearer than in the instant case. Harold
and Nellie Dowsett were rendering a service for the same
person, together at the same time and place, and to a
comm.on purpose. Neither was charged with any superintendency over the other. They were equal in authority.
Whil-e engaged together in ~the operation of the car, the
manner in which one would drive wou ld naturally tend
to have an influence upon the conduct or care of the
other. Each was interested in his or her own safety, and
each concerned and intent upon reaching their destination in safety. These facts are established wi,thout dispute through the testimony offered by the plaintiff.
It follows the trial court did not err in directing a
verdict upon the fellow servant rule.
II. No Right to Control
The only other distinction raised 1by appellant is that
1

right to control is essential to the establishment of the
relationship of master and servant, (see App. Br. page
10). Appellant argues that as there was no riqlif to con-
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trol a~ to defendant, Darwin Do\V~Ptt, then tlw rPlationship of n1aster and ~<>rvant doP~ not exist. ~n~·~
appellant:
"In the present ea~l' there wa~ a total a hsence of a right to control what wa~ to hr done.
Danvin Dow~<='tt g·ave no directions a~ to how hi~
car was to be driven or as to what route wa:-; to
be taken.·· (App. Br. page 11).
\Ye concur in this view. Darwin Dowsett was not
concerned and did not reserve any right to give directions as to hmv 'the car was to be driven, or as to what
route was to be taken. His concern, if any, wa~ that the
car ultimately reach its destination at Camp Maxey,
Texas. He did not claim the right to control the actual
operations and details of the trip. As to the defendant,
Darwin Dowsett, the services being rendered by Harold
and Nellie Dowsett, his father and mother, were in the
nature, if anything, of independent services or an independent contract, such as this court makes reference to
in Fo.r r. Lavender, 89 Utah lJ;), 56 Pac. (2d) 1049, at
page 120 of the Utah report:
'' :\f any cases have loosely used expressions
such as 'for and on behaU,' or 'in the business
Df,' or 'for the benefit of.' As stated before, the
inquir~· must be directed to the question of agency
in the operation of the car rather than to the
question of agency for the accomplishment of
some ultimate pu.rpose. In the case of an independent contractor a pen.;on may have the right
of control over the act to be done at the destination or at the beginning, but another party or the
driver himself may have control in the operation
of thr car during ~the trip. In the case of a taxi-
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cab the fare has the right to control the destination but not t<;> control the operation of it.''
Those in the car had control of the sHuation. They
had the right to determine when they left Salt Lake what
route they would take, who they would visit if they so
chose on the way, what sigbts they would see, when anct
how far they would travel each day, or whether they
would travel at alL Those in the car were in fact in
complete C0ntrol of the situation as to the operations
of the car. In fact, no one claims ~to the contrary. Appellant so contends and defendant agrees. That matter
appears without dispute.
The fact that· the defendant, Darwin Dowsett, did
not have the right to control the details of the trip is not
inconsistent with defendant's contention that the fellow
servant rule applies, because all the fundamental e~e
ments of the fellow servant rule may exist and the
nature of 1the service being rendered fall within the category of that of an independent contractor or ulf}imate
purpose rule as stated in Fox v. Lavender, supra.
However, if there was no right to control, (and that
there was none appears without dispute), there could be
no liability whatsoever upon the part of the defendant,
Darwin Dowsett, under the rule of respondeat superior,
which is the on~y possible basis that he could be helct
liable in any event. McFarlane v. Winters, 47 Utah 598,
155 Pac. 437 supra .
. III. If Mrs. Dowsett was not a fellow servant, she
was a guest.
The pertinent part of the Utah guest statute, Section 57-11-7, provides as·follows:
1
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··Any pt>rson who a~ a g-tw.~t accepts a ri(lP
in any vehicle, nwving upon an~· of the public
highwa~·::-: of the ~tate of Utah, and whi~P ~o riding
a~ ~nrh gnP~t reePive~ or ~n~tain~ an injury, :-;hall
have no right of rerover~· against the owner or
driver or person responsible for the operation of
~urh vehicle. * * * Xothing in this ~crtion shall
he construed a~ relieving the owner or driver or
person responsib'le for the operation of a vehicle
frmn liability for injur~· to or death of such gue1't
proximately resulting fron1 the intoxication or
willful misconduct of such owner, driver or person responsible for the operation of such vehicle;
prorided, that in any action for death or for injury or damage to person or property hy or on
behalf of a guest or the estate, heirs or legal representatives of such guest, the burden shall be
upon plaintiff to establish that such intoxication
or willfu~ misconduct was the proximate cause of
such death or injury or damage."
"57 -11-8. 'Guest' Defined.
''For the purpose of this section the term
'gue~t' is hereby defined as being a person who
accepts a ride in any V<"hicle without giving compensation therefor.''
If plaintiff was not a fellow servant in this case, then
she was a guest within the terms of the foregoing statute, and cannot recover because no wilful misconduct or
intoxication on the part of 'the driver or on the part of
the defendant, Darwin Dowsett, was claimed or proved.
IV. Assumption of Risk.
The reason for the assumption of risk rule is similar in principal to the application of the fellow servant
rule and is an additional reason in this case why averdict was properly direCJted in defendant's favor .. vVhen
2fl
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p~aintiff left home, she knew her husband's ability as a
driver. She likewise knew the ordinary hazards which
ar~ attendant upon such a trip, including the morning
sun, which could and sometimes does have the effect of
suddenly blinding, eastbound travelers at that time of the
morning.
Plaintiff testified that her· husband was driving in an
ordinary a.nd usual manner ( Tr. -125) ; that he was paying attention to his driving, was on his proper side of
the highway traveling rut a speed of about thirty to thirtyfive miles per hour. He seemed to have perfect control
of the car, and she, plaintiff, had no criticism at all of the
manner in which he was driving and made no objection

thereto (Tr. 126).
Mrs. Dowsett really did not blame her husband for
the accident any more than she would bllame herself had
she been driving and the sun suddenly blinded her. At
the outset of the trip, she knew the dangers of traveling
and the dangers which were incident to the operation of
the car by herself and her husband. Under the conditiDns, she and her husband were mutually undertaking to
safely drive the car:

Under such circumstances, she

should not be entitled to recover against the defendant,
Darwin Dowsett, who had no actual control or right
to control the details of the trip.
Where the risk is voluntarily assumed, plaintiff i::-~
not allowed to recover. Mabee v. Mabee, 79 Utah ;)S5,11
Pac. (2d) 973.
26.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUMMARY

\Ye haYt> outlined ~eyernl reason~ wh~· it wa~ prop·'r
that a Yerdict be directed in this ea~P. 1_1lw defendant,
Darwin Dow~ett, was not present in the car, and admittedly hi~ only conrPrn \Va~ the uHin1ate destination
of the ear. Therefore, the only theory upon whieh he
could be held liable at all would be under the doctrine
of respondeat ~uperior. The undisputed lack of .right
to control the automobile during the trip is sufficient and
adequate reason for denying recovery in this case. That
the rule of respondeat superior in ib app'lication often
works an injustice or undue hardship upon the principal
or master when he is not in actual possession and control
of the automobile, but has merely a ri,qht to control, is
recognized generally. However the law does not exJend
liability to an owner who does not have the rlight to control, during the trip, although he is interested in th~
arrival at the ultin1ate destination.
The decision in this case does not have to rest upon
that rea~on alone. Assuming there were the right to control, the fe'llow servant rule would then apply for the
reasons hereinabove outlined. \Ve have rather extensively reviewed the authorities upon that question and we
are convinced of its application.
If neither of those reasons exist, that is, if there was
no agenc~· or a fellow servant involved, then plaintiff was
a guest, and cannot recover for 'that reason.

Fourth, plaintiff well knew the conditions under
which she was traveling much better than defendant
either knew or could have known. She and her husband

....

;")-
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were in control of the situation. Knowing the conditions
and having the he1tter opportunity to avoid an accident,
it is more logical to conclude that she assumed the risk
and the hazards of the trip than to attach liabiHty upon
the def,endant, who admittedly had no control over ~the
particular situation or operation of the car.
If the court's ruling in directing a verdict was proper upon any grounds (and it is not our intention to
waive any of 1the grounds assigned), the decision and
judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
We respectully submit that such should he the decision of this court.

Respectfully submitted,

STEWART, CANNON & HANSOK
E. F. BALDWIN, JR.
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
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